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Abstract
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for firms under symmetric oligopoly
with differentiated goods. We consider two patterns of game; the Cournot game in
which strategic variables of the firms are their outputs, and the Bertrand game in
which strategic variables of the firms are the prices of their goods. We will show that
the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game, and the max-
imin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game for the firms are all
equivalent. However, the maximin strategy for the firms are not necessarily equiva-
lent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the Cournot game nor the Bertrand game.
But in a special case, where the objective function of one firm is the opposite of the
sum of the objective functions of other firms, the maximin and the minimax strate-
gies for the firms constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the Cournot game and the
Bertrand game.
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1
1 Introduction
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for firms under symmetric oligopoly with
differentiated goods. We consider two patterns of game; theCournot game inwhich strate-
gic variables of the firms are their outputs, and the Bertrand game in which strategic vari-
ables of the firms are the prices of their goods. The maximin strategy for a firm is its
strategy which maximizes its objective function that is minimized by a strategy of each
rival firm. The minimax strategy for a firm is a strategy of each rival firm which mini-
mizes its objective function that is maximized by its strategy. These strategies are defined
for any pair of two firms. The objective functions of the firms may be or may not be their
absolute profits. We will show that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the
Cournot game, and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game
for the firms are all equivalent. However, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strat-
egy) for the firms are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the
Cournot game nor the Bertrand game. But in a special case, where the objective func-
tion of one firm is the opposite of the sum of the objective functions of other firms, the
maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for the firms constitute the Nash equilibrium
both in the Cournot game and the Bertrand game, and in the special case the Nash equi-
librium in the Cournot game and that in the Bertrand game are equivalent. This special
case corresponds to relative profit maximization by the firms.
In Section 5 we consider a mixed game in which some firms choose the outputs and the
other firms choose the price as their strategic variables, and show that the maximin and
minimax strategies for each firm in the mixed game are equivalent to those in the Cournot
game and the Bertrand game.
2 The model
There are n firms. Call each firmFirm i , i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng. The firms produce differentiated
goods. The output and the price of the good of Firm i are denoted by xi and xi . The
inverse demand functions are
pi D fi.x1; x2; : : : ; xn/; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (1)
They are symmetric, continuous and differentiable. We consider symmetric equilibria.
Differentiating (1) with respect to pi given pj ; j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; j ¤ i , yields
@fi
@xi
dxi
dpi
C
nX
jD1;j¤i
@fi
@xj
dxj
dpi
D 1:
@fj
@xi
dxi
dpi
C @fj
@xj
dxj
dpi
C
nX
kD1;k¤i;j
@fj
@xk
dxk
dpi
D 0; j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; j ¤ i:
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By symmetry of the model, since @fi
@xj
D @fj
@xi
and @fj
@xj
D @fi
@xi
at the equilibrium, they are
rewritten as
@fi
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .n   1/@fj
@xi
dxj
dpi
D 1:
@fj
@xi
dxi
dpi
C

@fi
@xi
C .n   2/@fj
@xi

dxj
dpi
D 0:
From them we get
dxi
dpi
D dxj
dpj
D
@fi
@xi
C .n   2/@fj
@xi
@fi
@xi
  @fj
@xi
 h
@fi
@xi
C .n   1/@fj
@xi
i (2)
and
dxj
dpi
D dxi
dpj
D  
@fj
@xi
@fi
@xi
  @fj
@xi
 h
@fi
@xi
C .n   1/@fj
@xi
i (3)
because dxi
dpj
D dxj
dpi
and dxi
dpi
D dxj
dpj
at the equilibrium. We assume
@fi
@xi
¤ 0; @fj
@xi
¤ 0; @fi
@xi
  @fj
@xi
¤ 0; @fi
@xi
C .n   1/@fj
@xi
¤ 0; @fi
@xi
C .n   2/@fj
@xi
¤ 0: (4)
The objective function of Firm i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng is
i.x1; x2; : : : ; xn/:
It is continuous and differentiable. It may be or may not be the absolute profit of Firm
i . We consider two patterns of game, the Cournot game and the Bertrand game. In the
Cournot game strategic variables of the firms are their outputs, and in the Bertrand game
their strategic variables are the prices of their goods. We do not consider simple maximiza-
tion of their objective functions. Instead we investigate maximin strategies and minimax
strategies for the firms.
3 Maximin and minimax strategies
3.1 Cournot game
3.1.1 Maximin strategy
First consider the condition for minimization of i with respect to xj ; j ¤ i , given xi
and xk’s, k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; k ¤ i; j . It is
@i
@xj
D 0; j ¤ i: (5)
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Depending on the value of xi we get the value of xj which satisfies (5). Denote it by xj .xi/.
Differentiating (5) with respect to xi given xk’s k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; k ¤ i; j , we have
@2i
@x2i
C @
2i
@xi@xj
dxj .xi/
dxi
D 0:
From this
dxj .xi/
dxi
D  
@2i
@x2
i
@2i
@xj @xi
:
We assume that it is not zero. The maximin strategy for Firm i is its strategy which max-
imizes i given xj .xi/ and xk’s k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; k ¤ i; j . It is defined for any pair of i
and j ¤ i . The condition for maximization of i is
@i
@xi
C @i
@xj
dxj .xi/
dxi
D 0:
By (5) it is reduced to
@i
@xi
D 0:
Thus, the conditions for the maximin strategy for Firm i are
@i
@xi
D 0; @i
@xj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (6)
(6) are the same for all pairs of i and j ¤ i .
3.1.2 Minimax strategy
Consider the condition for maximization of i with respect to xi given xj ; j ¤ i , and
xk’s, k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; k ¤ i; j . It is
@i
@xi
D 0: (7)
Depending on the value of xj we get the value of xi which satisfies (7). Denote it by xi.xj /.
Differentiating (7) with respect to xj given xk’s, k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; k ¤ i; j .
@2i
@x2i
dxi
dxj
C @
2i
@xj@xi
D 0:
From it we obtain
dxi.xj /
dxj
D  
@2i
@xj @xi
@2i
@x2
i
:
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We assume that it is not zero. The minimax strategy for Firm i is a strategy of Firm
j; j ¤ i , which minimizes i given xi.xj / and xk’s ,k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; k ¤ i; j . It is
defined for any pair of i and j ¤ i . The condition for minimization of i is
@i
@xi
dxi.xj /
dxj
C @i
@xj
D 0:
By (7) it is reduced to
@i
@xj
D 0:
Thus, the conditions for the minimax strategy for Firm i are
@i
@xi
D 0; @i
@xj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
These conditions are the same for all pairs of i and j ¤ i . They are the same as conditions
in (6).
3.2 Bertrand game
The objective function of Firm i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, in the Bertrand game is written as
follows.
i.x1.p1; p2; : : : ; pn/; x2.p1; p2; : : : ; pn/; : : : ; xn.p1; p2; : : : ; pn//:
We can write it as
i.p1; p2; : : : ; pn/;
because i is a function of p1; p2; : : : ; pn. Interchanging xi , xj and xk by pi , pj and pk in
the arguments in the previous subsection, we can show that the conditions for themaximin
strategy and the minimax strategy for Firm i in the Bertrand game are as follows.
@i
@pi
D 0; @i
@pj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (8)
The conditions in (8) are the same for all pairs of i and j ¤ i . We can rewrite them as
follows.
@i
@pi
D @i
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .n   1/@i
@xj
dxj
dpi
D 0; j ¤ i;
@i
@pj
D@i
@xi
dxi
dpj
C @i
@xj
dxj
dpj
C .n   2/@i
@xk
dxk
dpj
D@i
@xi
dxi
dpj
C @i
@xj

dxi
dpi
C .n   2/dxi
dpj

D 0; j ¤ i; k ¤ i; j;
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because dxj
dpj
D dxi
dpi
; @i
@xk
D @i
@xj
and dxk
dpj
D dxi
dpj
at the symmetric equilibrium. By (2) and
(3) and the assumptions in (4), they are further rewritten as
@i
@xi

@fi
@xi
C .n   2/@fj
@xi

  .n   1/@i
@xj
@fj
@xi
D 0;
@i
@xi
@fj
@xi
  @i
@xj
@fi
@xi
D 0:
Again by the assumptions in (4), we obtain
@i
@xi
D 0; @i
@xj
D 0; j ¤ i:
They are the same as conditions in (6). We have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game, and
the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game for the firms are all
equivalent.
4 Special case
The results in the previous section do not imply that the maximin strategies (or the min-
imax strategies) for the firms are equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the
Cournot game nor the Bertrand game. But in a special case the maximin strategies (or
the minimax strategies) for the firms constitute a Nash equilibrium both in the Cournot
game and the Bertrand game.
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for the firms are
@i
@xi
D 0; @i
@xj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (6)
The conditions for a Nash equilibrium in the Cournot game are
@i
@xi
D 0; @j
@xj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (9)
(6) and (9) are not necessarily equivalent. The conditions for Nash equilibrium in the
Bertrand game are
@i
@pi
D 0; @j
@pj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (10)
(8) and (10) are not necessarily equivalent. However, in a special case those conditions are
all equivalent. We assume
i D  
nX
jD1;j¤i
j ; or i C
nX
jD1;j¤i
j D 0: (11)
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By symmetry of the oligopoly
i D  .n   1/j :
Then, (9) is rewritten as
@i
@xi
D 0; @i
@xj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (12)
(12) and (6) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies
for the firms in the Cournot game constitute a Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game.
@j
@xj
D 0 in (9) means maximization of j with respect to xj . On the other hand, @i@xj D 0
in (12) and (6) means minimization of i with respect to xj .
Similarly, (10) is rewritten as
@i
@pi
D 0; @i
@pj
D 0; j ¤ i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (13)
(13) and (8) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies
for the firms in the Bertrand game constitute a Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game.
Since the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies in the Cournot game and those
in the Bertrand game are equivalent, the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game and that
of the Bertrand game are equivalent.
Summarizing the results, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the special case in which (11) is satisfied: The maximin strategies and the
minimax strategies for the firms constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the Cournot game
and the Bertrand game.
This special case corresponds to relative profit maximization1. Let Ni be the absolute
profit of Firm i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, and denote its relative profit by i . Then,
i D Ni   1
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
Nj ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
We have
nX
iD1
i D
nX
iD1
Ni  
nX
iD1
Ni D 0:
By symmetry of the oligopoly
i D  .n   1/j :
1About relative profitmaximization under imperfect competition, please seeMatsumura,Matsushima and
Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka
(2013a), Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997).
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5 Mixed competition
Suppose that the firstm firms choose the prices of their goods and the remaining n m firm
choose the outputs as their strategic variables. We assume 1  m  n  1. Differentiating
(1) with respect to pi ; i D 1; : : : ; m, given pk; k D 1; : : : ; m; k ¤ i , and xj ; j D m C
1; : : : ; n,
@fi
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .m   1/ @fi
@xk
dxk
dpi
D 1; k 2 f1; : : : ; mg; k ¤ i;
@fk
@xk
dxk
dpi
C @fk
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .m   2/ @fk
@xk0
dxk0
dpi
D 0; k 2 f1; : : : ; mg; k ¤ i; k0 ¤ i; k;
At the equilibrium we assume dxk0
dxi
D dxk
dxi
, @fk
@xk
D @fi
@xi
, @fi
@xk
D @fk
@xk0 D
@fk
@xi
. Then, they are
rewritten as
@fi
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi
dxk
dpi
D 1;
@fk
@xi
dxi
dpi
C

@fi
@xi
C .m   2/@fk
@xi

dxk
dpi
D 0;
From them
dxi
dpi
D
@fi
@xi
C .m   2/@fk
@xi
@fi
@xi
  @fk
@xi
 h
@fi
@xi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi
i ;
dxk
dpi
D  
@fk
@xi
@fi
@xi
  @fk
@xi
 h
@fi
@xi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi
i :
We assume
dxi
dpi
  dxk
dpi
D
@fi
@xi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi
@fi
@xi
  @fk
@xi
 h
@fi
@xi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi
i ¤ 0; (14)
dxi
dpi
C .m   1/dxk
dpi
D
@fi
@xi
  @fk
@xi
@fi
@xi
  @fk
@xi
 h
@fi
@xi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi
i ¤ 0: (15)
Differentiating (1) with respect to xj ; j D m C 1; : : : ; n, given pi ; i D 1; : : : ; m, and
xl ; l D mC 1; : : : ; n; l ¤ j ,
@fi
@xi
dxi
dxj
C .m   1/ @fi
@xk
dxk
dxj
C @fi
@xj
D 0; i 2 f1; : : : ; mg; k ¤ i:
At the equilibrium we assume dxk
dxj
D dxi
dxj
, @fi
@xk
D @fk
@xi
. Then, it is rewritten as
@fi
@xi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi

dxi
dxj
C @fi
@xj
D 0;
8
This means
dxi
dxj
D  
@fi
@xj
@fi
@xi
C .m   1/@fk
@xi
;
We assume dxi
dxj
¤ 0.
We write the objective functions as follows.
'i.p1; : : : ; pm; xmC1; : : : ; xn/ Di.x1.p1; : : : ; pn/; : : : ; xm.p1; : : : ; pn/; xmC1; : : : ; xn/;
i 2 f1; : : : ; ng:
Then,
@'i
@pi
D @i
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .m   1/@i
@xk
dxk
dpi
;
@'i
@pk
D @i
@xi
dxi
dpk
C @i
@xk
dxk
dpk
C .m   2/ @i
@xk0
dxk0
dpk
;
@'i
@xj
D @i
@xj
C @i
@xi
dxi
dxj
C .m   1/@i
@xk
dxk
dxj
;
@'j
@xj
D @j
@xj
Cm@j
@xi
dxi
dxj
;
@'j
@xl
D @j
@xl
Cm@j
@xi
dxi
dxl
;
@'j
@pi
D @j
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .m   1/@j
@xk
dxk
dpi
;
where i 2 f1; : : : ; mg, k 2 f1; : : : ; mg; k ¤ i; k0 ¤ i; k; j 2 fm C 1; : : : ; ng; l 2 fm C
1; : : : ; ng; l ¤ j . At the equilibrium dxk
dpk
D dxi
dpi
, dxk0
dpk
D dxi
dpk
D dxk
dpi
, @i
@xk0 D
@i
@xk
, dxi
dxl
D dxi
dxj
and @j
@xk
D @j
@xi
. Then, they are rewritten as
@'i
@pi
D @i
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .m   1/@i
@xk
dxk
dpi
;
@'i
@pk
D @i
@xi
dxk
dpi
C @i
@xk

dxi
dpi
C .m   2/dxk
dpi

;
@'i
@xj
D @i
@xi
dxi
dxj
C @i
@xj
C .m   1/@i
@xk
dxi
dxj
:
@'j
@xj
D @j
@xj
Cm@j
@xi
dxi
dxj
;
@'j
@xl
D @j
@xl
Cm@j
@xi
dxi
dxl
;
@'j
@pi
D @j
@xi

dxi
dpi
C .m   1/dxk
dpi

:
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By similar arguments to those in the previous sections, we obtain the conditions for the
maximin and minimax strategies for Firm i; i 2 f1; : : : ; mg, as follows;
@'i
@pi
D 0; @'i
@pk
D 0; @'i
@xj
D 0; i; k 2 f1; : : : ; mg; k ¤ i; j 2 fmC 1; : : : ; ng: (16)
From these conditions we obtain
@i
@xi
dxi
dpi
C .m   1/@i
@xk
dxk
dpi
D 0; (17)
@i
@xi
dxk
dpi
C @i
@xk

dxi
dpi
C .m   2/dxk
dpi

D 0; (18)
@i
@xi
dxi
dxj
C @i
@xj
C .m   1/@i
@xk
dxi
dxj
D 0: (19)
By (14) and (15), (17) and (18) imply
@i
@xi
D 0; @i
@xk
D 0; i 2 f1; : : : ; mg; k 2 f1; : : : ; mg; k ¤ i: (20)
From (19) we get
@i
@xj
D 0; i 2 f1; : : : ; mg; j 2 fmC 1; : : : ; ng: (21)
(20) and (21) are the same as the conditions in (6) for Firm i; i 2 f1; : : : ; mg.
The conditions for the maximin and minimax strategies for Firm j; j 2 fmC1; : : : ; ng,
are
@'j
@xj
D 0; @'j
@xl
D 0; @'j
@pi
D 0; j 2 fmC1; : : : ; ng; l 2 fmC1; : : : ; ng; l ¤ j; i 2 f1; : : : ; mg:
From them we obtain
@j
@xj
Cm@j
@xi
dxi
dxj
D 0; (22)
@j
@xl
Cm@j
@xi
dxi
dxl
D 0; (23)
@j
@xi

dxi
dpi
C .m   1/dxk
dpi

D 0: (24)
From (15) and (24) we get
@j
@xi
D 0: (25)
Then, by (22) and (23), we obtain
@j
@xj
D 0; @j
@xl
D 0: (26)
(25) and (26) are the same as the conditions in (6) for Firm j; j 2 fmC 1; : : : ; ng.
Therefore, the conditions for the maximin and minimax strategies in the mixed game
are equivalent to the conditions in the Cournot game.
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6 Concluding Remark
We have analyzed maximin and minimax strategies in Cournot and Bertrand games in
oligopoly. We assumed differentiability of objective functions of firms. In future research
we want to extend arguments of this paper to a case where we do not postulate differen-
tiability of objective functions2
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